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Another interesting work is presented in (Liu, Ye, Zhang & Li, 2008) where the 802.11i 4-way handshake protocol is analyzed utilizing High-level Petri Nets, confirming that the protocol is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service attack during handshake, then the authors propose an improved key management scheme. The goal of the chapter is to present the most important part of the PN theory and to describe the possibilities of practical applications on WSN. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the WSN are introduced, theirs principal characteristics and basic architectures, a brief introduction about to EC and LDPC codes and the basic concepts of PN are explained as well. In Section 3, we focus on the description of a communication model considered in order to a WSN. In Section 4, deal with the modeling phase by means of PN for our system. A PN model for the communication system and cryptography protocol are developed. Finally, we dedicated both a section to the conclusions and another to the references.-
Basic Concepts
In this section we developed briefly the topics that we are needed to better understand this work. For a deeper understanding look up the cited bibliography in each case.
The WSNs
The WSNs are defined as compound networks of a large number of tiny devices called sensor nodes, which have limited processing power, storage, bandwidth, and energy. In addition, a WSN might be often deployment on a large scale throughout a geographic region in hostile environments. According to how sensors are grouped and how the information of sensors is routed through the network, there are two basic architectures to WSN, flat and hierarchical. In a flat architecture all nodes have almost the same communication capabilities and resource constraints and the information is routed by each sensor. In a hierarchical architecture, the sensor nodes are grouped in clusters where one of the member nodes is the "cluster head". This node is responsible for management and routing tasks. Fig. 1(a) shows a flat WSN model and a hierarchical WSN configuration is showed in Fig. 1(b) . ized by the fact that all network nodes have the same properties unlike the heterogeneous (HeWSN) where nodes of different nature like temperature and movement sensors coexist. Fig. 1(b) shows a HeWSN. Including the base station there are three types of nodes: base nodes, header nodes and sensors nodes. The base station is the interface between an application and a sensor network. The application network implements all the programs which manage the sensor network. The header nodes are devices with capability to route information that comes from other nodes. The sensor nodes are those that perceive changes produced in the environment such as temperature, humidity, light, movement among others. Fig. 1(b) also shows the clustered sensor network. The sensor network is divided into several clusters. The headlines represent connection between the header nodes and the base station. Then header nodes manage the sensor nodes and route messages from others nodes; the sensor nodes are scattered in the monitoring field and it implements data process such as reading, encrypting, encoding and transmission. As shown in the Fig. 2 , a sensor node is composed of four basic components: sensing unit, processing unit, transceiver unit and a power unit.
Fig. 2. Components of a Sensor
The sensing units are usually composed of two sub-units: Sensors and analogy-to-digital converters (ADCs). The analogy signals perceived by the sensor which are based in the observed phenomenon are converted to digital signals by the ADC, and then they are nourished to the unit of processing. The process unit, that is generally associated to a little storage device, manages / handles the procedures which make the sensor node collaborates with the others nodes in order to carry out the assigned sensor task.
Elliptic Curves
In our scheme we are using an elliptic curve defined over a finite field of characteristic two. In this case we only considered a representation of field elements and exist efficient way to effect arithmetic operations. The option we choose is to use optimal normal base (ONB). In which the add operation can accomplish by means of the operation XOR, without cost; squaring can be performed simply by a cycle shift of the coordinates of an element, hence, in hardware, it is almost cost free. A normal basis multiplication is not so simple but always more efficient than in other base. Reference over multiplication in ONB can be found in (Reyhani, 2003; 2006) . According to (Hankerson et al., 2004) , an elliptic curve over a finite field F 2 m is defined as the set of points that satisfies the following equation:
where a, b ∈ F 2 m and b = 0i nF 2 m . The set of solutions (x, y) joined with a point at infinity, and special addition operation define an abelian group, are called the elliptic curve group. An Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) bases its security in the Elliptic Discrete Logarithm Problem (EDLP), that is, in the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) defined on the group of rational points of an elliptic curve. Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field F, a point G ∈ E(F) and another known point Q which is multiple of that point G. the problem is to find the integer n such that nG = Q. This problem is computationally difficult to solve.
LDPC codes
The Low-density parity check (LDPC) codes were introduced by Robert Gallager in 1962 (Gallager, 1962 , but with computational capabilities available then were dismissed. In the mid 90 were rediscovered by MacKay (MacKay, 1990) reaching great popularity by his performance closely to Shannon limit. LDPC codes are a class of linear block codes characterized to have its sparse parity-check matrix which contains only a few 1's in comparison to the amount of 0's. In other words, the degree of all nodes is low. These codes can be represented by a Tanner bipartite graph consisting of two sets of nodes {c i } and { f i }, respectively called variable nodes and check nodes. See example in Fig. 3 . 
The corresponding check matrix H has the property to be constructed with independent lineally rows vectors has which form a subspace of the subspace generated by the rows vectors of G. This signifies than each vector code satisfies the condition:
property that enables the decoding. In (Castiñeira & Guy, 2006) we found a chapter dedicated to the binary LDPC codes. Description, construction and decoding algorithms can be studied here. Other reference about to construction of codes is (Carrasco & Johnston, 2008) . The decoding of LDPC codes is based on sum product algorithm (SPA), also called belief propagation algorithm (BPA), or message passing algorithm (MPA) which iteratively updates the posterior probabilities of bit nodes. If we defined q i,j (b), b ∈{0, 1}, as the probability computed based both on the received signal y i and the message r j ′ ,i (b) passed from the neighbors check nodes c i excluding the check node j. Also, we defined r i,j (b) as the probability computed based on the message q j ′ ,i (b) passed from the neighbors variable nodes v j excluding the variable node i . The MPA in the probability domain then proceeds as follows.
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1. Estimate the noise power σ 2 . Then for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, initialize
2. Set q ij (b)=P j (b) if the variable node i and the check node j are connected.
3. Update r ij (b) using
where K ij is chosen to meet q ij (0)+q ij (1)=1.
5. Compute the posterior probability of the code bit c i using
where K i is chosen to ensure that Q i (0)+Q i (1)=1.
6. For i = 1, 2, ..., n set up:
If cH T = 0 or the number of iterations equals the maximum limit, stop; else, go to Step 2. Here, H is the parity check matrix of the LDPC codes.
Petri nets
A PN is identified as a particular kind of bipartite directed graph populated by three types of objects. They are places, transitions, and directed arcs connecting places and transitions. Formally, a PN can be defined by: Usually, actions are associated to transitions and conditions are associated to places. A transition is enabled if each input place of contains at least a number of tokens equal to the weight of the arc connecting to. When an enabled transition fires, it removes tokens from its input places and deposits them on its output places. PN models are suitable for representing systems that exhibit concurrence, conflict, and synchronization. Some important PN properties include a boundness (no capacity overflow), liveness (freedom from deadlock), conservativeness (conservation of non consumable resources), and reversibility (cyclic behavior). The concept of liveness is closely related to the complete absence of deadlocks. A PN is said to be live if, no matter what marking has been reached from the initial marking, it is possible to ultimately fire any transition of the net by progressing through further firing sequences. This means that a live PN guarantees deadlock-free operation regardless of the firing sequence. Validation methods of these properties include reachability analysis, invariant analysis, reduction method, siphons/traps-based approach, and simulation (Reisig, 1986) , (Reisig & Rozenberg, 1998) . Fig. 4 shows a block communication model we propose to communicate a header node and the base station in a hierarchical WSN. This model should use an elliptic curve encryption scheme and LDPC code in the process of messages transmission. On the left side we have the header node, transmitter of the message, and on the right side we have the base node, receiver of the message.
System Description

Fig. 4. Communication Model
In this model m represents the transmitted binary message sequence. This sequence gets into the system to an Elliptic Curve Encrypter/LDPC Encoder block, where a transformation function converts them to an output code c, called usually a codeword. This codeword is the input sequence to a modulator block which converts them in a modulated signal x, which goes through the communication channel. Here the signal is disturbed by the noise coming from transmission medium and suffers the fading effects own of the wireless channels. From this process derives a corrupted signalx, estimated from the signal x. Then the signalx enters to a demodulator block to be converted over again to a binary sequence. This sequence is called c and is an estimate of the codeword c. The LDPC Decoder / Elliptic Curves Decrypter block receives the binary sequence and transforms them by means of an inverse function in a message sequencem which is an estimate of the original message m. The base station receivesm as a valid message and the process finishes.
Modeling and Analysis
In this section we develop some derived PN models since the communication system we have presented in the section 3. Firstly we analyze the system from the perspective of the communication among process. Then, we model a cryptography scheme which would be based on an elliptic curve, which at the same time is defined on a finite field. 
Communication System
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Fig. 5. Petri Diagram of the Communication System
We have made some assumptions regarding to the system in order to simplify the model. 4. Both LDPC encoder and decoder are considered resources always available for the system.
The meaning of each place and transition is described in the Table 1 and 2 respectively. The initial marked which defines the system behavior denotes the following: The places P0 and P1 marked with one token tells us there is a new message and the transmitter is idle in order to transmit it. The places P4, P5 denotes resource availability to achieve the encryption process on the sender side. One mark in the place P4 will tell us that we count on a suitable EC and the another one in the place P5 will tell us as well that we dispose a valid public key to work on. In the same way the marks on the places P6 and P7 mean resource availability in order to achieve the decryption process on receiver side. In this case, one mark in the place P6 tells us that we dispose of the EC and anther one in the place P7 tells us that we count on a valid key to work on, here, the private key of the receiver.
On the other hand we have the coding resources, in the graphic represented by the places P13 and P14. A token allocated on the place P13 denotes LDPC encoder availability whereas the another one allocated on the place P14 shows the LDPC decoder is available. The places P22 and P23 represent noisy and fading processes into the channel. The tokens on these places www.intechopen.com
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denote presence of those processes. The last place marked from the initial marked of the net is P21 which means that the channel is idle and free to transmit a signal. Table 1 . Places Description of PN in Fig. 5 Basically the PN shows different status that a message has to go through the communication process. The transitions represent functions that transform the message into different phases of process. Thus we have as follows:
Place Description Place Description
1. Initially, the transition T0 is triggered, since the initial marked on the places P1 and P2 enable to do it. Then the message passes to incoming message status (place P3 is loaded with a token);
2. The transitions T4 triggers, because of the tokens in its incoming places P3, P4, P5 enables it. Then these ones are removed, new tokens are generated and allocated on the single output place P11 passing to the encrypted message status.
3. In the same way the transition T7 triggers removing the tokens from the places P11 and P23 and loading another two into places P10 and P15. The token in P10 makes conditional the resources restoring and the one in P15 turns the message into an encode message status. On the other one the transition T5 triggers tokens which restore both the curve and encode parameters.
4. A token on P15 enable the transition T9 which accomplishes his trigging passing to modulated message status, (place P18 is marked with a token).
5. Enabled now, the transition T11 trigger removing the token from P18 and allocating one into the place P0 and another one into the place P19 (message in the channel input).
www.intechopen.com Table 2 . Transitions Description of PN in Fig. 5 All these processes above encrypting-encoding-modulating belong to sender side, and in inverse proportion to this we have the receiver side; demodulating-decoding-decrypting. Nevertheless, we must as well to describe the channel process. Simply to say that if both places P9 and P21 are loaded each with a token, besides the places P22 and P23 then the transition T12 trigger. In other words, if there is a message in the channel input and this is idle, on the other hand there are both the noisy and fading processes, then the disturbance process is enabled which generate distortion in the message. We perform two types of analysis over the PN model: a structural and a graph based analysis. The aim of the first is to show that the amount of states is finite (boundedness) and that all the represented activities can be done (liveness). The aim of graph based analysis is to determine the absence of dead states. The analysis was performed with the Petri net analyzer tool INA Roch & Starke. (1999) . Table 3 shows the structural analysis of the model of Fig. 5 where we can see there are eleven P/Invariants including all places, so we can conclude that the net is bounded. There are one T/Invariant (Table 7) covering all transitions, so the model is live. Finally the resulting reachability graph has 80 states large enough to draw it here.
Place Invariants
1 P4+P5 2 P6+P7 3 P6+P9 4 P4 + P10 + P11 5 P10 + P13 6 P6 + P12 + P14 7 P2+P8+P22+P16+P17 8 P0+P3+P4+P10+P15+P8 9 P20 + P21 10 P22 + P23 11 P22 + P24 Transition Invariants 1 T1+T2+T3+T4+T5+T6+T7+T8+T9+T10+T11+T12+T13 Table 3 . Place and Transition Invariants of the Net in Fig. 7. 
Cryptographic Protocol
We have used a sequence diagram (Fig. 6 ) to describe part of a secure communication protocol. It is based in the public key encryption scheme proposed by Menezes-Vanstone in (Menezes et al., 1993 ) but also we have considered (Ontiveros et al., 2006) . Specifically is considered the communication between a sensor and header node.
Fig. 6. Sequence Diagram of the Encryption and Decryption Process
It is important to consider the moments which operations are accomplished, with the aim of minimizing communication times. The sensor and header node should have same elliptic curve cryptoprocessor embedded in their architecture and both should know also a rational point G which is a curve points generator. The sequence diagram of Fig. 6 describes the behaviour of the protocol, as follows: when the sensor node wishes to send a message m to their header node, sends a security communication request. The header node reply with a acknowledgment of receipt (ack) leaving the communication established. Both nodes performs concurrent tasks, the sensor node generates a random number r and computes C1 = r * G, meanwhile the header node generates a random number d and computes Q = d * G. After, when the sensor node has completed its task it sends the point computed C1 to the header node that receive it and sends the point Q to the sensor node. Again, both nodes accomplish concurrent task with the received components as showed in the Fig. 6 . The sensor node computes C2 = r * Q and it get the coordinate x from C2 to compute it with the message m which compress and send it to the header node. Meanwhile, the header node B computes the point d * C1 received and it gets its coordinate x which it will use next to the decryption process. The next step consist in that collector node decompress and decrypts the message m computing m = C2/x. Finally, in order to reduce the complexity, we assume that the sensor node close the communication.
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Conclusion
We have used PN to model and formally analyze a communication system which holds a elliptic curve encryption scheme and it could works on a WSN. The results obtained shows formally that our approach are correct. However, we plan increase the complexity of models. We should consider critical factors related to constrained capacities of sensors nodes. We have analyze a more elaborate encryption scheme keep in mind adding a intermediate entity for the keys management.
